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This paper reports the collective finding from 102 field studies that look at the 
relationship between two organization design variables: span of control and span of 
accountability. Clustering the data yields propositions suggesting that the relationship 
between these variables may be an important determinant of strategic exploitation and 
exploration activities. 
Data from the field studies suggest that, in accordance with the controllability 
principle, accountability and control are tightly aligned for exploitation activities. 
However, this result was found in only a small number of tasks and functions. In the 
majority of situations, spans of accountability were wider than spans of control. This 
“Entrepreneurial Gap” is posited to be a result of management’s desire for innovation and 
exploration—and used as a catalyst for changing strategy, creating high levels of 
customer satisfaction, or motivating people to navigate complex matrix organizations. 





The need for organizations to both exploit current resources and explore new 
opportunities is a central and longstanding theme in the literature of organizations. As 
March (1991) acknowledges, interest in understanding the tension “between the 
exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties” stretches back at 
least to Schumpeter (1934).  
The reason for this interest is clear. On the one hand, firms must exploit the 
resources they currently control to generate adequate economic returns. Firms that fail to 
do so will be unable to attract capital to support continuing operations. But exploitation 
of current capabilities is not sufficient for long-term success. Organizations must also 
explore new ways of doing things as their environments change. Products, processes, and 
ways of creating value must evolve in response to changing circumstances. Failure to 
explore and adapt will lead to a firm’s eventual demise. 
The challenge, of course, is that these two imperatives require very different 
structures and skills. Exploitation demands a focus on efficiency and effectiveness in 
executing pre-set plans and procedures. Exploration requires the ability to step outside 
these routines by emphasizing experimentation, creativity, and novelty. 
Strategic management researchers have attempted to reconcile these competing 
demands. Building on Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) distinction between differentiation 
and integration, a variety of studies have proposed structural mechanisms that can foster 
either exploration or exploitation to support different competitive strategies (Gupta, 
Smith, and Shalley, 2006; Smith and Tushman, 2005; Benner and Tushman, 2003; 
Rivken and Siggelkow, 2003;  and Katila and Ahuja, 2002). 
Rejecting the notion that organizations must focus on one or the other, Duncan 
(1976) and Tushman and O’Reilly (1996, 2004) argue that organizations should strive to 
be ambidextrous: to build the capability to manage both of these imperatives 
simultaneously. To achieve this goal, a variety of mechanisms have been proposed such 
as cross-functional teams and independent units linked together by an overarching 
management hierarchy.   
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In summarizing the work on exploration and exploitation, Raisch et al (2009) 
suggest that further research is needed to probe the following questions: Should the 
relative balance between these two imperatives vary with specific tasks and activities? 
Can organizational context affect an individual’s ability to engage in exploration versus 
exploitation? Does the balance between these two forces vary over time?  
In this study, I attempt to shed light on these questions by focusing on the 
relationship between two organization design variables—span of control and span of 
accountability. Using data from 102 field studies, I illustrate how these variables can be 
manipulated by managers to tilt the balance toward either exploration or exploitation in 
response to different tasks, different organizational contexts, and changing competitive 
environments. 
 
Control Systems for Exploiting and Exploring 
Control systems are traditionally seen as tools for exploiting current resources. 
This perspective is evident in the first published definition of management control as, 
"the process of assuring that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in 
the accomplishment of the organization's objectives" (Anthony, 1965). Newer 
incarnations of management control systems, such as the balanced scorecard, adopt a 
similar perspective. Performance management systems are top-down tools for deploying 
resources in the execution of top management’s intended goals, plans, and strategies 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996). 
But the use of control systems is not limited to exploitation of existing 
capabilities. They can also be used to motivate exploration and adaptation. In earlier 
work, for example, I illustrate how top managers use control systems interactively to 
focus organizational attention on strategic uncertainties, leading to the emergence of new 
strategies over time (Simons, 1991, 1994). 
The research on management control systems to date has one notable omission: it 
has focused on the efficient and effective deployment of organizational resources without  
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regard to organizational context or design. Research has not yet addressed whether the 
structure of an organization—specifically the different ways that managers allocate 
resources to employees and units—makes a difference in the ability of managers to use 
control systems as tools for exploitation and exploration. 
The only agreed-upon principle in this regard is the longstanding precept that 
authority over resources should equal, or align with, responsibility for  performance. As a 
recent management textbook states, “An important principle of organization as well as 
management is that authority should equal responsibility. This principle is known as the 
parity of authority and responsibility and ensures that work will be performed with a 
minimum of frustration on the part of personnel. By not delegating authority equal to 
responsibility, a manager will create employee dissatisfaction and generally waste energy 
and resources.” (Montana and Charnov, 2000, p. 195) 
In the accounting and performance management literature, this is referred to as 
the “controllability principle,” which states that a manager should be evaluated based on 
that which he or she controls. Or, stated in the negative, a manager should not be held 
accountable for unfavorable outcomes or credited with favorable ones if they are due to 
causes not under his or her control (Arrow, 1974: 284; Antle and Demski, 1988; 
Bouwens and Van Lent, 2007; Giraud, Langevin, and Mendoza, 2008).  
The controllability principle is the underpinning of responsibility accounting—the 
creation of organization units such as revenue centers, cost centers, and profit centers for 
which individual mangers can be assigned responsibility for performance (Hawkins and 
Cohen, 2004).  
In the remainder of this paper, I explore situations in which the controllability 
principle is violated. Moreover, I argue that, in an age of customer-driven innovation, the 
common-sense idea that a manager’s responsibility for the performance of a unit should 
be commensurate with his or her ability to exercise authority over the people and assets 





To gain an initial understanding of the relationship between accountability, 
control, and organization design, I conducted interviews with managers in seven large 
companies—an international bank, two electronics manufacturers, a pharmaceutical 
company, a software development firm, a computer manufacturer, and a hotel company. 
In each firm, interviews with managers at various levels were supplemented with 
examination of documents related to control systems and organizational resources. 
The interviews in each of these seven firms revealed a consistent anomaly. 
Contrary to the controllability principle, managers reported being responsible for 
performance measures that were broader than the resources they controlled. For example, 
a senior regional manager in the hotel business described how he was accountable for 
regional revenue, profit, customer satisfaction, and employee satisfaction. Yet, these 
measures were outside his direct control. To achieve his performance goals, he was 
forced to rely on people in other functions who did not report to him including finance, 
human resources, sales and marketing, engineering, and operations. In other words, this 
manager—and many others interviewed in the other six firms—reported that their 
responsibility was greater than their authority.  
 
Beta, Inc. 
To add some context to this observation, consider Beta, Inc. (disguised name), a 
successful high-technology software development company that specialized in the 
development of customer relationship management (CRM) software. As a stand-alone 
software developer, Beta did not install its products or train users. Instead, customers 
hired third-party consultants to implement their new systems, supply supporting context, 
and train their employees. At the time of the study, the company employed 8,000 people. 
Seventy percent of Beta’s worldwide revenue was generated by repeat orders 
from existing customers. As a result, Beta’s strategy focused on building long-term  
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relationships with large, global customers through product excellence and dedicated 
customer service.  
 
Structure 
Beta did not have a formal organization chart, although everyone seemed to agree 
on what such a diagram would look like. Employees described their organization design 
as a series of concentric rings around the customer as illustrated in Figure 1. The regional 
sales function, which managed the overall relationship with the customer, represented the 
first ring. The second ring, product marketing, contained technical engineering groups for 
each major product category (horizontals) and specialized industry groups (verticals) that 
customized the product to suit the needs of different industries. The third ring contained 
corporate support functions and the external alliance partners. 
 
This diffuse structure—with customers in the center—had a pronounced effect on 
behavior. As the vice president of finance stated, “You can put up a red flag and say, ‘I 
have a customer satisfaction problem.’ Everyone drops everything to help you. Our goal 



















































Beta, Inc. had very sophisticated performance measurement systems. In addition 
to financial performance measures such as revenue, account profit, and cash flow, senior 
managers tracked a variety of nonfinancial measures including customer satisfaction, 
product quality, employee satisfaction, and alliance partner satisfaction.  
Because of the importance of repeat purchases from existing customers, customer 
satisfaction was the most important measure for everyone at Beta, Inc. For people 
involved in product development and delivery, bonus payments were contingent on 
achieving 100% customer satisfaction scores and bonuses were withheld until installation 
was complete and the customer was totally satisfied. Compensation of other people 
throughout the organization was also tied to customer-related measures and designed to 
be increasingly variable for employees working closest to customers. 
Because of the diffuse organization structure illustrated in Figure 1, an individual 
manager’s success against customer satisfaction targets involved gaining access to 
resources that were not under any one individual’s control. A general manager of one of 
the business units described this tension: 
“To do my day-to-day job, I depend on sales, sales consulting, 
competency groups, alliances, technical support, corporate marketing, 
field marketing, and integrated marketing communications. None of these 
functions reports to me and most do not even report to my group.”  
To succeed in this environment—which contravened the controllability 
principle—managers had to be creative in navigating internal boundaries, building 
networks of support, and influencing others to help achieve shared goals that 






To understand the implications of this finding, I utilize two analytic concepts 
described in Simons (2005): span of control and span of accountability. 
Span of control is typically defined as the number of people who report to a boss 
(Mintzberg, 1979, 134-35; Perrow, 1986, 30-33). Thus, span of control is often reported 
as a number such as 10 or 12. Following Simons (2005, p. 39), I adopt a different 
definition. Span of control in this study is defined more broadly as the total resources 
under a manager’s direct control. Span of control includes not only people (the 
traditional definition), but also balance sheet assets and intangible assets such as 
information infrastructure. For any individual job, span of control can be either wide, 
indicating control of a wide range of resources, or narrow, indicating that a manager has 
direct control of relatively few resources.  
The second span needed for our analysis is span of accountability, representing 
the range of tradeoffs inherent in the measure(s) for which a manager is accountable 
(Simons, 2005, pp. 88-89). Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of span of accountability for 
both financial and non-financial measures. At the bottom of the funnel, measures such as 
headcount and line item expense budgets allow few tradeoffs. Managers accountable for 
these measures have relatively few degrees of freedom and, therefore, a narrow span of 
accountability. The measures at the top of the funnel, such as competitive position and 







Following the controllability principle, span of control and span of 
accountability should align with an individual’s position in the organizational 
hierarchy. For example, a CEO would have both wide span of control 
(responsibility for all the firm’s resources) and wide span of accountability 
(accountability for broad measures such as stock price and competitive position). 
A shop floor supervisor, in contrast, would have narrow span of control and 
narrow span of accountability.  
We can use two sliders—one for span of control and one for span of 
accountability—to depict what this relationship would look like (Figure 3). For 
the CEO with wide span of control and wide span of accountability, both sliders 
are pushed to the right and aligned. For the shop supervisor, the sliders are still 
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But what happens in the case of Beta Inc.? In this situation, managers are 
accountable for resources they do not control. As illustrated in Figure 4, the 
sliders do not align. Span of control is narrow and its slider is pushed to the left 




What are the consequences of this misalignment? One possibility is employee 
frustration and turnover (Montana and Charnov, 2000, 195; Merchant,1989: 25). There is, 
however, another possibility suggested by scholars of entrepreneurial behavior. 
Entrepreneurship, as defined by Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) is, “the process by which 
individuals—either on their own or inside organizations—pursue opportunity without 
regard to the resources they currently control.”  
This, in fact, is exactly the situation illustrated in Figure 4. With span of 
accountability wider than span of control, an individual is accountable for figuring out 
how to turn opportunities into results even though he or she does not control the 
resources to get the job done. Could it be that this gap, which represents a shortfall of 
resources relative to the task at hand, is a reflection of conditions conducive to 
entrepreneurship—and exploration—in complex organizations? 
Following this logic, we label the gap illustrated in Figure 4 as the 
Entrepreneurial Gap, acknowledging that it is perhaps no accident that the 
majority of managers interviewed in the seven companies in the initial stage of 













The Entrepreneurial Gap 
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than their span of control. There may, in fact, be good reason for managers to hold 
subordinates accountable for variables outside their control if they want them to 
act as entrepreneurs, exploring new possibilities for creating value for customers.  
 
Additional Field Studies 
To more fully understand the relationship between span of accountability 
and span of control in a wide range of settings, teams of researchers (second-year 
Harvard MBA students) collected data on the relationship between span of 
accountability and span of control in 102 different organizations.
1 For each field 
study, researchers interviewed employees and/or managers and collected 
company data that would allow them to determine the relationship between span 
of accountability and span of control.  
The unit of analysis varied widely in the studies: in some cases, the focus 
was on senior managers; in other circumstances, the focus was on lower-level 
production workers. But in every instance, data was collected on (1) the resources 
that individuals controlled directly and (2) the nature of the measures for which 
those same individuals were accountable. In addition, data was collected on the 
business’s strategy and key design variables including nature of the task and 
structural configuration adopted by the firm. From this information, research 
teams were able to quite easily determine for each group studied whether span of 
control was greater than, equal to, or less than span of accountability.  
Conclusions regarding span of control and span of accountability in each 
of the separate field studies were double checked by two faculty researchers. 
Then, the 102 field studies were classified into groups according to the 
relationship between the two spans (span of control <, =, > span of 
accountability). Each of these three groups was then analyzed for consistency in 
patterns of business strategy and/or  design attributes. This clustering, which was 
                                                 
1 This work was completed as part of the course requirement for the second-year MBA seminar, Designing 
Organizations for Performance.  
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double checked by a second faculty researcher, yielded the eight separate clusters 
described below. 
This research is, by nature, exploratory and results must remain tentative. 
Accordingly, the findings are presented in the form of propositions subject to 
further testing. Nevertheless, the analysis of a large number of firms in a variety 
of industries illuminates circumstances under which accountability and control 
may act as a catalyst for exploitation and exploration activities.  
The eight clusters of field studies yielded four general propositions. The 
first—where span of accountability aligns with span of control—focuses on 
exploitation activities. Hypotheses two and three consider the entrepreneurial 
gap—situations where span of accountability is greater than span of control—
thereby providing incentives for people to engage in exploratory activities. 
Hypothesis four considers the uncommon, and generally unhealthy, situation 
when span of control is greater than span of accountability. 
 
Results 
Proposition 1: Managers set span of accountability equal to span of 
control for routine work and functions.  
“A monkey could run this thing.”  
 
-CEO referring to automated work process 
 
A relatively small number of situations studied (15 firms, 15% of sample) 
were classified as having tight alignment between span of accountability and span 
of control as predicted by the controllability principle.  
This group included a military team engaged in routine tactical operations, 
the work of an accounting department in a large packaged-goods consumer 
company, hourly workers in a food processing company, an HR benefits  
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department, and managers of a call center that focused on low cost and efficiency 
through standardization. The typical relationship between span of control and 














Routine Work: Span of Accountability = Span of Control
 
The focus of tasks in this cluster was on exploiting existing resources. 
There was little desire by superiors for innovation. Individuals were given control 
over relatively limited resources needed to carry out their routine work functions. 
Goals in the form of short-term tactical objectives were clear and measurable. 
Although resource allocations were relatively limited, so was the range of 
decision trade-offs needed for the task. The objective was to get the job done as 
efficiently and effectively as possible.  
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Proposition 2: Managers create an entrepreneurial gap—setting span of 
accountability wider than span of control—to motivate independent employee 
initiative and innovation. 
“Your mission is to win our war.”  
-U.S. Army General 
 
For the bulk of the organizations in the sample (71 firms; 70% of sample), 
managers reported that span of accountability was wider than span of control. 
Moreover, the entrepreneurial gap widened with the degree of exploration and 
entrepreneurship that was required for each specific job or function. 
Nine of the organizations showed only a modest widening of span of 
accountability relative to span of control. But the result of this gap was the same 
across all situations studied. 
Consider the sales representatives of a national soft drink bottling 
company where logistics and routes were determined centrally by head office. 
Sales reps had a narrow span of control: they were given relatively few resources, 
told which routes to cover and which products to offer, and provided with defined 
pricing options.  
Strict application of the controllability principle would suggest that sales 
reps should also have a narrow span of accountability. One might expect, for 
example, that they would be held accountable for measures such as daily delivery 
quotas. Instead, span of accountability was widened by holding them accountable 
for sales revenue thereby providing the freedom to make tradeoffs. Sales reps 
were encouraged to exercise initiative to enhance product mix, offer special 
arrangements to high potential customers, and build customer relationships to 
maximize volume and revenue.  
For more senior jobs in this cluster, span of control was wider than the 
sales reps. But span of accountability was wider still. Field studies of several 
military units—a U.S. Army combat team, a U.S. Marine helicopter commander,  
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and the U.S. Marines in their race to Baghdad—illustrate the point. Under battle 
conditions, span of control shifted sharply to the right as unit leaders were put in 
charge of a full complement of resources to engage the enemy. Yet, span of 
accountability was widened even further. Instead of accountability for narrow and 
detailed tactical objectives (the norm during routine maneuvers), unit leaders were 
now accountable for mission success. This broad mandate demanded wide-
ranging tradeoffs and entrepreneurial initiative in engaging the enemy and 
innovating in rapidly changing battle conditions. 
These examples serve as an illustrative backdrop to the general 
phenomenon. The remaining 62 organizations in this group —all with large 
entrepreneurial gaps—can be split into five clusters to illustrate the different ways 
that managers used these levers of accountability and control as catalysts of 
strategic exploration. 
 
Proposition 2a: Managers widen the entrepreneurial gap to support new, 
more innovative strategies. 
“This was the only way to unlock people and  
make them more entrepreneurial.” 
  
-head, commercial pharma operations 
 
Eleven organizations with an entrepreneurial gap (11% of sample) were in 
the midst of changing their strategy to promote more product/market innovation. 
Managers did the same thing in all of these situations: they widened the 
entrepreneurial gap by either widening span of accountability, narrowing span of 
















Widening  the Entrepreneurial Gap to Stimulate Change
 
Senior executives of a China-based computer company, for example, 
wanted to increase innovation in their R&D unit. To do so, they widened span of 
accountability. Managers of the R&D unit, who had previously been accountable 
only for meeting corporate funding allocations, were now accountable for the 
number of new models launched, the number of design awards won, successful 
market introduction of new software, and the number of models ranked as top 
sellers in the market. Success against these broad measures would require 
significant innovation as well as support from other units within the business. 
A similar story was told at an investment bank where executives wanted to 
boost innovation. Group heads, who had previously been accountable for narrow 
measures related to transaction volume, were given full profit and loss 
accountability. The group heads were now accountable for bringing in their own 
business, deciding how to allocate resources, and managing costs to maximize 
profitability. With this wider span of accountability, they were expected to be 
more entrepreneurial in choosing between cost cutting and revenue generation in 
satisfying long-term client needs.   
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In another example in this cluster, executives of a biological 
pharmaceutical firm wanted more market-focused innovation to drive growth. 
They redesigned their organization from a pure functional structure to a market-
based business-unit structure. Newly-appointed business heads, who had 
previously served as functional managers with tightly aligned accountabilities, 
were put in charge of customer-facing marketing units and made accountable for 
contribution margin and building a sustainable therapeutic franchise (dramatically 
widening their span of accountability). Since these managers controlled only the 
marketing groups of their business (narrow span of control), they were forced to 
act as entrepreneurs to acquire and coordinate the resources needed for 
competitive success. Not surprisingly, individuals with perceived entrepreneurial 
instincts were the ones chosen for these critical positions.  
A similar approach was adopted by executives of a European investment 
firm who wanted to change their strategy to focus on innovation in the delivery of 
products and services to larger clients. To support the change in strategy, span of 
control for managing directors was narrowed by assigning each director access to 
only five client companies instead of the twenty or more clients they had served 
under the previous strategy. At the same time, their span of accountability was 
widened by adding both cross-selling and overall company performance to their 
previous accountability for revenue. Collectively, these changes widened the 
entrepreneurial gap substantially. 
In another firm in this cluster—a national clothing retailer—the CEO 
wanted to execute a turnaround that would restore the brand to prominence. The 
CEO stimulated innovation by simultaneously narrowing span of control for 
market-facing units and widening their span of accountability.  
In the past, the powerful retail units had controlled all aspects of their 
business with weak accountability for performance. He reduced their span of 
control by consolidating key support functions such as sourcing, IT, and HR to 
corporate headquarters. He also increased span of accountability by holding retail 
unit managers accountable for brand profit, merchandising success, and customer  
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satisfaction—forcing them to become both more accountable and more 
entrepreneurial. The result was an increase in new product introductions that 
appealed to target market customers and a reduction in markdowns for slow-
moving merchandise. 
 
Corollary to Proposition 2a: Managers narrow the entrepreneurial gap to 
reduce innovation and increase the focus on efficiency. 
 
“When I arrived, I found people all over the organization  
doing the same thing.”  
 
-CEO of computer company 
 
In certain situations, managers may want to increase the focus on 
exploitation and efficiency. To do so, they narrow the entrepreneurial gap to 
reduce innovation. In one study, for example, the new CEO of a high technology 
computer company wanted to reign in a free-wheeling entrepreneurial culture to 
improve operating efficiency. The organization, which operated as a typical free-
for-all entrepreneurial start-up, was redesigned as a functional organization. With 
this change, span of control increased for the new functional managers who were 
given formal control of newly-designated functions and departments. At the same 
time, span of accountability was narrowed. In the past, managers had been 
accountable for broad measures such as market share growth and technology 
development. Now, they were accountable for much narrower functional 
measures that allowed fewer tradeoffs. Some managers were accountable for 
sales; others for cost efficiencies. The effect was to narrow span of accountability, 





Proposition 2b: Managers create an entrepreneurial gap to implement 
strategies that require high levels of customer satisfaction. 
“Your number one goal is to provide outstanding customer service.”  
 
-retail CEO speaking to new employees 
 
Like the Beta, Inc. field study described at the beginning of this paper, a 
significant number of firms in the broader sample (20 firms; 20% of sample) 
widened spans of accountability to drive consistently high levels of customer 
satisfaction.  
Consider, for example, an automotive supplier that sold integrated parts 
such as exhaust systems to the big three U.S. auto manufacturers. Because of 
industry concentration, this firm could not afford to lose a single customer. 
Program managers within each division, with predictably narrow spans of control, 
were accountable for two broad measures: project profitability and customer 
satisfaction. To achieve these measures, they had to make a variety of tradeoffs 
affecting the revenue and cost of multi-year programs. Decisions to boost profit 
often worked against customer satisfaction. Program managers, who did not 
control all the relevant resources for a satisfied customer relationship, were forced 
to be entrepreneurs in finding creative ways of working with other managers and 
functions to make tradeoffs that could sustain long-term customer loyalty. 
Nine firms in this cluster were retailers attempting to deliver a unique 
experience to generate customer loyalty and repeat sales. Firms in this group 
included several upscale clothing retailers, a direct sales cosmetics firm, and an 
innovative retail bank. In each case, employees were held accountable for 
customer satisfaction measures that were significantly wider than their span of 
control. At one apparel retailer, for example, sales associates who had little 
control over merchandising or other key variables were accountable for customer 
satisfaction through a sales-per-hour measure and were expected to make  
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tradeoffs that would build long-term customer loyalty. Similarly, a direct sales 
firm known for its entrepreneurial sales force held sales consultants accountable 
for sales volume and the number of active recruits but provided only a narrow set 
of company resources to assure success on these measures. 
An additional nine firms in this cluster were professional service firms—
consulting firms, accounting firms, and healthcare firms—attempting to build 
long-term partnerships with clients. Again, customer satisfaction was essential to 
long-term success. These firms used dedicated account teams to deliver 
customized sales and implementation services to customers. Although no single 
person on the team controlled all the resources needed to deliver results on these 
measures, each individual was accountable for customer satisfaction and repeat 
business. To succeed, they were required to act as entrepreneurs—building 
relationships, acquiring and borrowing resources, and working with customers to 
pull together project teams to ensure a fully satisfied customer. 
Two studies in this cluster looked at the entrepreneurial gap in charter 
schools which are exempt from state or local regulations and governed under a 
contract or “charter” with the state. These schools, which operate as for-profit 
businesses, provide parents with the option of removing their children from state-
regulated schools to a more performance-oriented environment. But the 
satisfaction of parents, who as customers can opt out at any time, is critical to 
ongoing success.  
In both schools, teachers’ span of accountability was unusually wide. In 
one charter school, for example, teacher performance was evaluated on three 
primary measures: parent satisfaction ratings, student achievement scores, and 
principal evaluation. Faced with a chronic shortage of resources (i.e., narrow span 
of control), teachers in these schools were forced to be entrepreneurial—shaping 
the curriculum to the needs of individual students, sharing best practice across 
classrooms, and introducing innovations into teaching methods whenever 
possible.   
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Another study of a progressive public school described the “performance 
agenda” and techniques used to stimulate entrepreneurial behavior at the principal 
level: in this system, fifty percent of each principal’s evaluation was based on 
student test score improvement. 
 
Proposition 2c: Managers create an entrepreneurial gap to stimulate 
work across silos in large, complex organizations. 
“They have no choice but to figure out how to be accountable to 
both a product line boss and a regional boss.” 
  
-executive vice president of multinational engineering company 
 
In a significant cluster of the 71 organizations with an entrepreneurial gap 
(21 firms; 21% of sample), senior managers were attempting to motivate people 
to work across the boundaries, functions, and business units that had been created 
by complex organization designs. By widening span of accountability in the face 
of relatively scarce resources, subordinates were forced to interact with people in 
other parts of the organization who controlled resources they needed to achieve 
their goals. 
For example, executives in a worldwide real estate firm who wanted to 
increase coordination across geographic units created an entrepreneurial gap by 
narrowing the span of control of regional managers. Investment decisions, 
previously made in the regions, were centralized to corporate headquarters. But 
country managers were still held accountable for local project profitability. 
Without direct access to funding resources, country managers were now forced to 
be entrepreneurial in figuring out how to work across borders and with 
headquarters to gain acceptance for deals they wanted to initiate.  
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A similar situation was reported in a telephone communications company. 
To reduce local product variation, executives narrowed the span of control for 
managers in the regional sales departments by centralizing all product-related 
decisions. At the same time, they widened their span of accountability to 
encourage work across organizational boundaries. In the past, the regional sales 
managers had been measured primarily on the number of new customers added. 
New performance measures—handset upgrades (loyalty), portability, and value 
added services—increased both span of accountability and the entrepreneurial 
gap. The result: sales people began to work with marketing, corporate 
development, and the central sales function to achieve their new goals. 
Two others firms used broad financial metrics such as ROCE and 
customer satisfaction to foster collaboration. In one firm, a functional supply 
chain manager, who did not control sales, production, or installation staff, was 
measured quarterly on net sales revenue. This made him accountable for 
everything that occurred between receiving an order until the cash was collected 
from the customer. The entrepreneurial gap caused by narrow span of control and 
wide span of accountability forced him to be innovative in building relationships 
with a variety of internal departments to ensure that products met customer 
specifications and customers paid on time. 
In another firm, a medical products firm with two major product lines, 
managers were attempting to motivate cross-selling and new product development 
across the two separate product lines. Accordingly, span of accountability was 
widened by holding managers accountable for overall corporate performance and 
allocating 70% of their bonus to this measure.  
The most common use of the entrepreneurial gap to stimulate work across 
silos was in firms with matrix or dotted line reporting relationships (13 firms, 
13% of sample). Matrix reporting relationships reduce spans of control 
throughout an organization as individuals are forced to use their networks of 
influence to compete for shared resources. A computer services firm in China, for 
example, operated a three-dimensional matrix—industry, geography, and  
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product—so that no individual manager controlled all the resources needed for 
success. Yet, individual accountability for sales revenue required managers to 
seek out resources controlled by others to ensure success against performance 
targets.  
Similarly, a consumer packaged-goods company reorganized from 
regional groups to worldwide product groups with a regional matrix overlay. At 
the same time, spans of accountability were widened to encompass performance 
measures for volume, sales revenue, earnings, and brand equity growth across 
global brands, geographic markets, and key retail partnerships. Success on these 
measures required inputs by many different groups within the company. For 
example, the global business units, which were accountable for brand P&L, relied 
on regional marketing organizations for market execution. The geographical 
marketing organizations, responsible for sales and sales growth, were forced to 
rely on the global business units for overall marketing strategy and product 
development. Managers in these various units had no choice but to figure out how 
to coordinate and innovate to meet their performance targets. 
Many of the companies using matrix reporting structures adopted the same 
approach. In one computer company known as “a society of corporate 
entrepreneurs,” product groups had full P&L accountability, but did not control 
manufacturing and sales. Similarly, in a large manufacturing firm with four 
industrial sectors, responsibility for central operating core functions such as 
sourcing, IT, and employee services was allocated to the operating divisions so 
that each division was accountable for at least one “Center of Excellence” over 
which it did not have direct control. This created a matrix where employees were 
asked to be “dual citizens”—with broad accountability for both the performance 





Proposition 3: Entrepreneurs within organizations can succeed only if 
sufficient resources exist to help and support them. 
 
“It is possible that the broad level of accountability for crew members has 
been too great and counterproductive.”  
 
-small business owner 
 
For the entrepreneurial gap to bear fruit, there must be sufficient resources 
in the organization—including the willingness of others to help—to allow 
individuals to find the resources and support that they need. Most of the 
organizations in the study appeared to benefit from the innovation and 
coordination created by the entrepreneurial gaps. But nine of the 71 firms (9% of 
sample) reported problems due to insufficient resources.  
In one privately held firm (a logging operation), operators with little 
training or resources were held accountable for operating profit. This well-
intentioned mismatch between span of accountability and span of control—
designed to foster local initiative— led instead to frustration because the operators 
had little ability to influence the direction of the business.  
In two organizations with wide entrepreneurial gaps (an investment bank 
subsidiary and a strategy consulting firm start-up) there were not enough 
resources to go around, and their strategies ultimately failed. The investment bank 
centralized operations to London, thereby diminishing resources for Latin 
America managers who were still accountable for revenue and new business 
development (wide span of accountability). With this narrowed span of control, 
managers were now forced to rely on deal specialists in London who did not 
allocate sufficient attention to make the strategy succeed. The Latin America 
office was subsequently closed. 
Similarly, in a consulting firm acquired by a competitor, accountability 
was broadened from revenue growth to profitability—widening span of  
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accountability. But country units were too small to achieve critical scale, and 
other units from the acquiring firm were unwilling to help by lending needed 
resources. As a result, the business failed. 
Other firms reported similar problems when (1) a gap existed between 
span of accountability and span of control and (2) there was little willingness 
inside the firm to help others secure resources or serve a customer.  
 
Proposition 4: When span of control is greater than span of 
accountability, organizations suffer from slack and inefficiencies in operations. 




In sixteen of the companies studied (16% of sample), span of control 
exceeded span of accountability as illustrated in Figure 7. In all but one of these 
organizations, this situation was due to inadequate performance controls and/or 

















Organizational Slack Exists Where 
Span of Control > Span of Accountability
 
In six of the firms, excess resources and lack of accountability created 
inefficiencies that led to organizational slack. One organization was a not-for-
profit that enjoyed bountiful resources because of volunteer activities but used 
these resources inefficiently because of weak accountability systems. A second 
example was a Japanese trading firm where there was no link between results and 
bonuses. Employees were given a bonus of two months’ salary regardless of 
performance and, as a result, there was little concern about utilizing resources 
efficiently, eventually throwing the firm into crisis. Similarly, in a Thailand rice 
company, functional managers with full control of large departments were 
accountable only for simple volume measures with no accountability for profit 
and loss indicators. Inefficiency, organizational slack, and underperformance 
were the result. 
In some of these firms, the narrowing of span of accountability was due to 
a dysfunctional top management style. One study focused on an entrepreneurial 
start-up where the operating norms demanded that all decisions be pushed up to 
senior managers. Although employees throughout the firm controlled the day-to-
day resources, they were not allowed to make tradeoffs about how to utilize these  
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resources. Frustration, slow decision making, and underperformance were the 
results. A second study looked at an entertainment company where the CEO 
micromanaged the creative studios heads. Even though studio executives had 
wide ranging resources, the CEO inserted himself in all key decisions, usurping 
the ability of subordinates to make key tradeoffs. In this case, the resulting 
frustrations resulted in the defection of key employees. Ultimately, the CEO was 
forced out of the business. 
Only one situation in this cluster seemed to offer justification for setting 
span of accountability narrower than span of control. This was a nuclear power 
plant where executives wanted no innovation or entrepreneurial initiative. In this 
situation, employees had wide spans of control as they operated this complex 
facility, but were accountable for detailed standard operating procedures and 
measures intended to reduce any ability to make tradeoffs. Redundancies and 
multiple levels of signoffs were required for all operating decisions—large and 
small. The effect was to assure safe operations, but at the cost of expensive 






Several caveats bear repeating before discussing the results of this study. First, the 
analysis relies on data provided in field studies conducted by second-year MBA students. 
Their work and conclusions were checked and rechecked by faculty researchers, and the 
clustering into the groups reported in this study was also independently verified, but the 
results must remain tentative. Second, the descriptive results reported in this analysis are 
not linked to any organizational performance variables. As a consequence, although there 
was a high degree of consistency within identified clusters, there is no evidence that the 
choices made by managers are optimal.  
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Notwithstanding these limitations, there was a high degree of consistency in the 
findings across multiple settings and industries, suggesting three tentative conclusions. 
First, the structural design attributes that are typically associated with exploitation 
and exploration activity may tell only half of the story. The findings of this study suggest 
that it is the tension between the resources allocated by organizational architecture and 
accountability for those resources that provides a powerful catalyst for strategic 
exploitation and exploration. 
In the 102 field studies reported here, span of control aligned with span of 
accountability in only a small percentage of situations—where work was routine 
and independent employee initiative and innovation was not required. For these 
tasks and functions, managers were clearly operating in exploitation mode.  
The majority of field studies reported a significant gap between span of 
accountability and span of control. This “entrepreneurial gap” is posited to be a 
result of management’s desire for innovation and exploration—and used as a 
catalyst for changing strategy, creating high levels of customer satisfaction, or 
motivating people to navigate complex matrix organizations. The consistency of 
this finding across a wide variety of organizations suggests that the gap between 
span of control and span of accountability is no accident: managers seem to 
deliberately hold subordinates accountable for measures that are wider than their 
span of control to foster exploration activities. 
The second idea flows from the first. Most of the research on exploration and 
exploitation has focused on design architecture (centralization/decentralization, internal 
venture groups, alliances) and related organizational coordinating mechanisms. We must 
remember, however, that these structures are merely tools to affect the behavior of 
individuals. It is individuals, in the end, who must devote their energy and attention to 
either exploiting current resources or exploring for new opportunities.  
There has been some recent interest in understanding how individual character 
traits can be linked to the propensity to engage in exploration and/or exploitation 
behaviors. For example, it has been suggested that individuals who are by nature creative  
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and curious may be ill-suited to the conformity required for exploitation. Conversely, 
people who are comfortable in predictable routines may be unable to shift to roles that 
require exploration, novely, and search for new ways of doing things. (Amabile, 1996; 
Mom, van den Bosch, and Volberda, 2009). 
The findings reported here suggest that managers may not have to take individual 
character traits as a binding constraint. Instead, they may attempt to shape behavior—
tilting people toward exploitation or exploration—through mechanisms of accountability 
and control. In concept at least, the same person could be motivated to tilt one way or the 
other depending on the alignment of these two design variables. In the field studies that 
reported significant change underway, for example, managers widened or narrowed the 
entrepreneurial gap with the expectation that whoever was in that job would respond 
appropriately.  
The final idea relates to the concept of ambidexterity. Tushman and O’Reilly 
(1996, 2004) have argued that organizations can and should develop special structures 
and skills to simultaneously exploit and explore. This study refines their insight by 
suggesting that managers can fine-tune their organization along these two dimensions 
more easily than we may have suspected. Managers can choose to have some tasks, jobs, 
and units in exploit mode and adjust accountability and control to achieve efficiency, 
effectiveness, and compliance. At the same time, managers may choose other tasks, jobs, 
and units where creativity and exploration are needed. For these situations, accountability 
and control can be adjusted to create an entrepreneurial gap. Moreover, these two 
variables provide levers to change from one state to the other fairly easily: simply 
narrowing or widening either span of control or span of accountability (or both) has the 
potential to drive change in the desired direction. 
Of course, the propositions offered in this paper must remain tentative pending 
further research. But I hope that they may generate interest among organization scholars 
in exploring the power of accountability and control in complex organizations. 
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